Savile:  Who deleted the intelligence reports?

  • Crime and Parliamentary affairs correspondent TIM HICKS reports exclusively with a new insight on how Jimmy Savile was able to manipulate the Surrey Police investigation and on how disappearing intelligence reports assisted Savile to evade detection.


Following up on my article on the North Yorkshire Police investigation into the North Yorkshire Police response to Real-Whitby’s criticism over its failure to detect Jimmy Savile and Peter Jaconelli for fifty years, I decided to focus on the still unexplained issue of the missing intelligence reports in North Yorkshire Police, revealed exclusively in the above article.

The results of my enquiry are truly alarming.

The Intelligence reports that should have been available to police intelligence in all forces.

Surrey Police, Sussex Police and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, have all confirmed that notifications were sent to all forces about Savile on at least three occasions.

  • According to Surrey Police, in response to intelligence passed to it from Dorset Police:  “At the start of the enquiry [into Savile] in 2007, Surrey Police conducted a check via INI (Impact Nominal Index)  – a system designed to share intelligence between forces. A request was sent to every police force in the country to check their records for information relating to Savile. This returned no trace of similar allegations. Sussex Police then received an allegation in 2008 and, as a result of them conducting an INI check, they liaised with Surrey Police. The Jimmy Savile Stoke Mandeville Hospital Trust were also aware of the details of our investigation and subsequent interview with Savile in 2009.”

  • Paragraph 7.15: The initial INI was sent to North Yorkshire Police on the 20th of July 2007 and responses were received on the 22nd of July.

The missing Intelligence:  North Yorkshire Police


However in the North Yorkshire Police report to the IPCC, Deputy Chief Constable Sue Cross (who served most of her career in North Yorkshire Police and West Yorkshire Police) claimed that Savile was not held as a “nominal” (ie someone that had been notified as a person of interest to another force) in North Yorkshire Police Force Intelligence.

  • The Cross report clearly contradicts the evidence of HMIC, Surrey and Sussex Police, who state that requests for information on Savile were sent to North Yorkshire Police via INI.

  • Having received notice from two forces that a man who lived in Scarborough was involved in two separate paedophile investigations, one would have thought this would have been of concern and that force intelligence would have considered if he could have offended in North Yorkshire, but apparently this intelligence process did not occur.

  • North Yorkshire Police conducted a major investigation into historical sexual offences in Scarborough in 2003, which generated so much intelligence it had to be recorded in HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System).  Although according to national and local newspaper reports, Savile, Jaconelli and Corrigan had featured in the 2003 investigation. North Yorkshire Police claims it held no intelligence on Savile, Peter Jaconelli or Jimmy Corigan at all, despite the fact that every schoolboy in Scarborough knew Jaconelli was a paedophile who operated relatively openly in Scarborough for about fifty years.

  • The Home Secretary directed HMIC to establish which police forces received reports and/or allegations in respect of Savile and related individuals prior to the launch of Operation Yewtree (5 October 2012); and, with regard to those forces, the extent to which those allegations were robustly investigated and if there were any police failings in so doing.  A spokesman for North Yorkshire Police commented in 2012:  “When the allegations surrounding Jimmy Savile were publicised, we carried out extensive searches of force records which did not reveal a local connection”.  This is despite the fact that had Savile lived in Scarborough since 1960 and was well known as a local personality.

  • The Cross report also claims there is no intelligence held regarding the alleged association of [Name Redacted, but thought to be Peter Jaconelli] and Savile prior to the media coverage associated with Operation Yewtree”.  North Yorkshire Police simply claims it was unaware that Savile was an associate of Peter Jaconelli, (although this was separately reported in the national press, the television and well known locally).

The missing Intelligence:  West Yorkshire Police

Being an inquisitive person I then looked for confirmation of what other forces had received to confirm if this was a systemic failure in force intelligence, or a failure specific just to North Yorkshire Police.  West Yorkshire Police had published a report on its failure to arrest Jimmy Savile called Operation Newgreen.

  • Paragraph 2.14:  “It has been identified that here were gaps of WYP´s knowledge regarding some pieces of intelligence as the force does not have a record of receiving it or the action taken.”

  • Paragraph 3.6: “On the 9th November 2012 WYP received a letter from HMIC outlining the aims of their investigation and requesting all intelligence and information held in relation to Savile be forwarded to them”.  Paragraph 3.7:  “WYP complied with this request and provided details of one crime report, regarding the theft of Savile’s spectacles; an intelligence report from Surrey Police in 2009 concerning their investigation into Duncroft School; and Savile’s death report from 2011. Subsequent checks conducted by Operation Newgreen identified a further four crime reports (with Savile as a victim) and a communication log relating to a friend of Savile. None of the additional reports relate to Savile committing any offences. It was established that the failure to locate these reports on the first occasion was due to poor searching procedures of the WYP computer systems”.

  • Paragraph 7.25: “In this conversation DI (A) [Surrey Police] agreed to send an intelligence report to WYP containing the allegations made against Savile. WYP have searched its intelligence systems as well as the officers’ emails and this report can not be found.” …”Neither WYP nor Surrey Police have any record on their systems of a report being sent by Surrey Police.”

  • Paragraph 3.11: “In January 2013 Surrey Police provided information from the interview they had conducted with Savile in 2009 when investigating sexual abuse allegations at Duncroft School. During this interview, Savile said that he would pass what he described as “weirdo” letters he received at his home address, to the police officers who attended the FMC. He went on to explain how the officers would take them away and deal with them. Surrey Police did not pass this information onto WYP until January 2013 and on checking WYP systems no record of such letters could be found”.  In the Operation Newgreen Report, West Yorkshire police excuse this omission by asserting that these letters were not in fact allegations of sexual offences, but begging letters and therefore did not need to be entered into police intelligence. This of course contradicts the evidence of Surrey Police Officers in the Operation Ornament Report and Savile’s evidence in the interview under caution, that some of the letters did relate to paedophilism and some were threatening; all criminal offences that should have been entered into police intelligence.  This begs the question of how could begging letters be used to blackmail Savile, if they were just begging letters why did Savile report them to the police, why would a West Yorkshire Police Officer confirm these letters related to crime and why would Savile admit to receiving similar allegations of paedophilism and threats under caution, if these were just harmless begging letters?

  • Paragraph 7.29“The report was put on to the WYP computerised intelligence system. However, the report was recorded on the system so that access to the information was restricted. Consequently, it was not shared across departments. Storing information in this manner is not unusual as information at times quite rightly has to be protected to ensure the safety of the person providing it and to restrict revealing operational activity that may compromise an investigation if it were to fall into the wrong hands; this is in line with legislation, force and national policy. The decision to protect it was made by a supervisor within the Force Intelligence Unit in line with correct force procedures to ensure that the Surrey investigation was not compromised.  Although this information was protected, had a search been done it would have been easily located. The detail within the report could then have been obtained if requested via a simple, widely used force procedure.”

  • Paragraph 7.15: “Enquiries conducted by Operation Newgreen have identified a former police officer who worked within the WYP Force Intelligence Bureau during the time the anonymous letter was received by the MPS. This officer, DC Y (WYP), worked on the specialist sexual offences intelligence desk. DC Y (WYP) was spoken to in February 2013 and recalled receiving some information from MPS relating to Savile in or around 1998 but could not remember the specific content of the report or who had sent it.  7.16 DC Y (WYP) was subsequently visited and spoken with and stated that the information may have included some discussion around conducting a joint investigation into Savile involving WYP and a number of forces, but the officer was unable to specify which forces. DC Y(WYP) said that the information received in relation to Savile had been sent by the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit with whom DC Y(WYP) had a good working relationship and could name a number of the officers. DC Y (WYP) could not remember which officer from the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit had sent the report. Other officers who worked within the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit and the Clubs and Vice Team have been identified and this enquiry is being progressed by the MPS.  7.17 The MPS officer, DC X (MPS), did not work within the New Scotland Yard Paedophile Unit and is not known to the WYP officer, DC Y (WYP). This brings into question whether the information being referred to by both officers is one and the same.  7.18 WYP officer, DC Y (WYP), did not record the information on any WYP computerised system but brought the information to the attention of his second Line Manager, D/Insp Z. DC Y (WYP) stated that D/Insp Z took the information from him and when DC Y (WYP) later asked what was happening with it, DC Y (WYP) was told that it was in hand…… 7.19 The information received in 1998 should have been entered on the force intelligence system by DC Y (WYP).” It was not present in WYP intelligence systems, which means it either wasn’t entered, or it was entered and then deleted. It is not known if any of these officers were members of the Friday Morning Club.

  • There is no mention at all of the 2007 INI check from Surrey Police and no explanation anywhere in the Operation Newgreen Report for this omission. 

  • An intelligence report containing the details of the Savile investigation was received by WYP on the 10th of June 2009 by e mail and it contained details of the offences at Duncroft School that Surrey Police’s intended to interview Savile over.  In the e mail dated 10th of June containing the intelligence reports regarding the progress of the investigation, the Surrey Detective Inspector made reference to the call received from the West Yorkshire Police Inspector who stated that “…there may be nothing in this but if there have been other allegations against him then they should really be recorded to build up an intelligence picture”.

West Yorkshire Police impact on the Surrey Police investigation

Surrey Police went on to interview Savile under caution.  Analysis of the interview transcript notes (which are redacted in parts) shows that Savile adopted a very structured and effective counter interrogation strategy to defeat the investigation.

Savile’s response falls during the interview essentially falls into six distinct and carefully prepared phases:

Phase 1:  Initial Surrey Police Contact to make arrangements to interview Savile under caution.  Savile responds immediately.

In accordance with normal procedure, on the 2nd of June 2009, Surrey Police sent Savile a recorded delivery letter to his home address in Leeds requesting that he make contact.

On the 3rd of June 2009, Surrey Police notified the Detective Chief Inspector that ran the West Yorkshire Police Child Protection Unit of the nature of the allegations against Savile, and that he intended to interview Savile under caution.  It is not known if this officer was a member of Savile’s Friday Morning Club.  The Detective from Surrey Police agreed to send an intelligence report containing the details of the Savile investigation to the Detective Chief Inspector from the West Yorkshire Child Protection Unit.

Savile telephoned and had a brief conversation with the Surrey Police officer who advised him of the nature of the allegations (paedophilism) and made an arrangement that they would meet when Savile was next in the area as he often attended Broadmoor.

During this initial contact, Savile stated there was a West Yorkshire Police Inspector who normally “deals with this sort of thing”.

Phase 2:  Following initial Surrey Police Contact to make arrangements to interview Savile under caution, Savile notifies his West Yorkshire Police contacts in the Friday Morning Club and immediately deploys them against Surrey Police in his defence. He then delays and waits to see if Surrey Police have been put off from pursuing its demand for an interview under caution.

Savile then contacted a West Yorkshire Police Inspector, who is presumably the officer that “deals with this sort of thing.  Six days later on the 8th of  June 2009 an Inspector from West Yorkshire Police (who was a member of the Friday Morning Club) rang the Surrey Police Control Room on the ridiculous pretext that Savile had lost the contact details of the Investigating Officer of Surrey Police and he was ringing to pass on his telephone number, so they could contact Savile again. Why Savile couldn’t look them up himself and needed a police inspector to do this for him is not explained.

Incredibly, according to the Surrey Police Inspector that took the call, the Inspector from West Yorkshire Police stated he was a personal friend of Savile ringing “Control Room to Control Room” (i.e. officially) on behalf of Savile, even though he knew Savile was a suspect in a major paedophile investigation by another force.  He also stated that “Jimmy gets so many of these type of complaints” (i.e. paedophilism). 

A further telephone conversation took place with Savile but by September he had failed to provide any arrangements to meet. Consequently the investigating officer from Surrey Police wrote again and on the 24th of September telephone arrangements were made for an interview with Savile.

Phase 3:  Interview introductions and caution at Stoke Mandeville Hospital on the 1st of October 2009.  Pages 1 – 4 (First tape)

The interview transcript in its entirety is here:

Savile Interview First tape:

Savile Interview Second tape:

Savile is cautioned and during Phase 3 appears relaxed, open, confident and cooperative.  He was so confident that he declined the opportunity of having a solicitor present.

Phase 4:  Specific Allegations of abuse put to Savile.  Pages 4 – 20 (First tape): 

Phase 4 is the critical part of the interview under caution which will determine if the detectives can generate through questioning, any admissions or extra evidence that will assist them to make a case for Savile’s prosecution.

  • He is very well prepared and knows about the history of Duncroft which he has off pat and has obviously studied beforehand.

  • He appears cooperative and affable in this phase of the interview.

  • He issues a blanket denial of each allegation in turn and continually asserts that there were always many people around him, to undermine the credibility of the allegation..

  • He consistently alleges he is the subject of blackmail.

  • He makes constant references to his association with Princess Alexandra calling her “Alex” and referring to her as a friend.  This was redacted from the original transcript that was released, indicating the extreme sensitivity of the police to any reference of the Royal Family in any investigation, which Savile may have been taking advantage of.

  • He constantly makes reference to the amount he has raised for charity and his connections.

  • When questioned and asked for specific information (e.g. on what car he was driving at any particular time) he is vague and does not provide it.

  • He does not seem at any point surprised at any of the allegations that are put to him, does not need any time to think about the incident referred to and remember the details, remembers how many people were there and where it occurred. He mentions that he attends at Leeds General Infirmary, Dunscroft Girls School and Broadmoor because he knows that the police are only aware of his offending there. He does not mention Rampton or the thirty other hospitals Full list here he had offended at, thereby preventing Surrey Police from opening up lines of enquiry at these hospitals which they were unaware of. This could indicate that he has prior knowledge of what the specific allegations that would be put to him were and had prepared for them in advance.

Phase 5:  Savile brings the Friday Morning Club into play again.  Pages 20 (First tape) – 6 (Second tape)

Savile mentions he is closely connected to the West Yorkshire Police, which normally deals with these allegations by dismissing them which -given he is mainly resident in Leeds- undermines the Surrey investigation.

  • To quote the Surrey Police Operation Ornament report: “He explained that he has contacts within the police at Leeds”.

  • He went on to state: “whenever he receives letters alleging that he has done something he gives them to his contacts”.

  • He further stated that his contacts at West Yorkshire Police ‘get rid’ of the letters making allegations against him.

  • The transcript confirms Savile stated he could have letters forensically examined as a ‘favour’ at the West Yorkshire Police Forensic lab at Wetherby.  This would appear to be a type of forensic examination where DNA is extracted from the envelope or letter and then run through the police intelligence DNA database to identify the sender.

  • When asked who the police officers in the Friday Morning Club, he takes great care not to reveal their names, so they cannot be traced by Surrey Police. He was obviously protecting his sources within the Police.

  • Savile denies knowing who the people who wrote the letters are, so they can´t be traced by Surrey Police and used as witnesses against him.

  • Although Surrey Police tried to trace the letters making allegations against Savile, they were never entered into West Yorkshire Police intelligence systems.  So it appears that the letters have indeed been destroyed by the Friday Morning Club and the victims that wrote them can´t therefore be traced.

Phase 6:  Intimidation.  Pages 3 – 6 (Second tape)

To quote the Surrey Police Operation Ornament report: “Savile concludes by explaining that he often gets these types of letters and his ‘policy’ is to get his lawyers to take these people to court and sue them. He has been successful on number of occasions and been awarded several hundred thousand pounds as a result.” The implication being that he will sue the Surrey Police officers if they continue their investigation.

Summary of the interview.

Savile´s interview strategy was perfectly thought out and completely successful. He stonewalled the Surrey detectives very effectively, admitted to nothing, did not provide the investigating officer with any extra evidence or lines of enquiry. He gave nothing away at all. It was a very professional performance.

In addition, he skillfully used the interview to pour scorn on the allegations, provided specific reasons and examples why he contended the allegations (which we now know were accurate) could not be true and were part of a blackmail plot. This perfectly undermined the evidence of the witnesses. He mentioned that he was closely connected to West Yorkshire Police which will have made Surrey Police very wary of getting involved in criticism of another police force and then finally, he intimidated the police officers with threats of legal action.

Intelligence failures in North and West Yorkshire Police

  1. West Yorkshire Police concede that “It has been identified that here were gaps of WYP´s knowledge regarding some pieces of intelligence as the force does not have a record of receiving it or the action taken.” And that it was unable to locate reports on Savile in its systems because of “poor searching procedures of the WYP computer systems”. The implication of this is that West Yorkshire Police Force Intelligence Unit is unable to manage intelligence information, cannot use its computer systems competently and cannot access all the intelligence in its possession to support criminal investigations.  This constitutes a systemic and catastrophic failure of the West Yorkshire Police Force Intelligence Unit.

  1. According to the evidence of Surrey Police, a West Yorkshire Police Inspector confirmed that Savile received many allegations of paedophilism. Savile’s evidence in the interview under caution confirmed that that some of the letters did relate to paedophilism and some were threatening. These all relate to criminal offences that should have been entered into police intelligence. To quote the surrey Police Operation Ornament report “if there have been other allegations against him [Savile] then they should really be recorded to build up an intelligence picture. They weren’t. They were destroyed by Savile’s friends Police Officers in the Friday Morning Club. It therefore appears that Police Officers from West Yorkshire Police may have destroyed evidence and withheld it from police intelligence.

  1. The West Yorkshire Police Operation Newgreen Report does not mention receipt of the 2007 INI request from Surrey Police sent on the 20th of July 2007, although according to Paragraph 7.15 of the Surrey Police Operation Ornament Report the initial INI was sent to West Yorkshire Police on the 20th of July 2007 and responses were received on the 22nd of July. So it appears that it was received and responded to, but no trace can now be found of it.  Nor can any trace be found of the intelligence from the Metropolitan Police in 1998. Police intelligence systems are supposed to be secure so intelligence does not simply disappear. The implications of this are that the INI intelligence report on Savile was deleted by police officers from Police Intelligence systems. It has not been released if members of the Friday Morning Club were members of the Force Intelligence Unit, what access they had to police intelligence systems and if they had the capacity to delete police intelligence.

  1. The intelligence report from Surrey Police containing all of the allegations against Savile was supposed to have been “recorded on the system so that access to the information was restricted   …. to restrict revealing operational activity that may compromise an investigation if it were to fall into the wrong hands; this is in line with legislation, force and national policy. The decision to protect it was made by a supervisor within the Force Intelligence Unit in line with correct force procedures to ensure that the Surrey investigation was not compromised.”  It was nevertheless easily locatable via a simple, widely used force search procedure, so despite the fact that this was supposed to be a sensitive document with restricted access, this intelligence report was easily accessible.  Given that Savile was known to associate with Police officers, this was a major breach of security policy over police intelligence.

  1. As a result of the failure to adequately restrict access to the Surrey Police Intelligence Report on Savile, members of the Friday Morning Club would have had access to all the police intelligence on Savile painstakingly assimilated by detectives in Surrey Police. Given that they routinely destroyed evidence and withheld it from police intelligence, it must be a concern that this report was accessed and its contents were made available to Savile, to assist in formulating his strategy to defeat the Surrey Police investigation. In this context it should be remembered that a West Yorkshire Police Officer acted as Saviile’s driver and bodyguard, it has been alleged that Savile routinely bribed officers from West Yorkshire Police and contributed generously to West Yorkshire Police charities,  On one occasion he boasted that if he were to go down he would take police officers with him:  Daily Telegraph How-far-did-police-go-to-protect-Jimmy-Savile, Providing more than enough motives for police officers to assist him. Further, Savile himself confirmed in the interview with Surrey Police Savile that he routinely had unlawful access to police resources and confidential information from West Yorkshire Police.  This admission was initially stated to relate to Wembley in London in the transcript of the interview under caution, but was subsequently confirmed to refer to the West Yorkshire Police forensic science lab at Wetherby. This aspect of the investigation has been completely ignored by West Yorkshire Police.

  1. As the police force area in which Savile principally lived throughout his life, the Detective Constable responsible for the specialist sexual offences intelligence desk should have considered the possibility that Savile had committed offences in West Yorkshire in 1998, on receipt of intelligence from the Metropolitan Police. Apparently though no further enquiries were made. Despite receiving intelligence information through INI from Surrey Police in 2007 that Savile was a suspected paedophile, West Yorkshire Police continued to use him to support crime prevention campaigns in 2008 and nine officers from West Yorkshire Police continued to socialize with him as members of his Friday Morning Club until his death in 2011.  Given that he was a well-known figure in Leeds and was known to associate with Police officers, this again constitutes a major failure by West Yorkshire Police Intelligence Unit to disseminate intelligence information to police officers, or reflects a decision to routinely ignore the allegations about Savile.

  1. North Yorkshire Police initially stated that we carried out extensive searches of force records which did not reveal a local connection” for Savile, although his local connections existed, were well known and North Yorkshire Police could not have been unaware of them. As a result of this falsehood North Yorkshire Police was excluded from the HMIC investigation which is incomplete and now stands fatally flawed as a result.

  1. Notifications were sent to North Yorkshire Police that Savile was the subject of allegations of paedophilism from Surrey and Sussex Police. Yet it stated that Savile did not feature on its INI system.  Intelligence does not simply disappear from intelligence systems, which are designed to be secure.  Yet in her report, Assistant Chief Constable Cross appears to be completely unconcerned at this catastrophic failure of North Yorkshire Police to record any intelligence at all on Savile and provides no explanation for this omission.

  1. Britains longest offending and most successful paedophile was Peter Jaconelli. Despite being well known locally for abusing boys and offending relatively openly in Scarborough, he does not feature in HOLMES anywhere, although he is alleged by witnesses to have featured in the major 2003 investigation into historical allegations of paedophilism going back to the 1980’s that was being managed though HOLMES.  ACC Cross also contends that North Yorkshire Police had no knowledge of any association between Peter Jaconelli and Jimmy Savile, although this was on the BBC and ITV and was well known locally.

  1. North Yorkshire Police received intelligence information through INI from Surrey Police in 2007 and Sussex Police in April 2008 that Savile was a suspected paedophile. This should have triggered some enquiry to consider if he had offended in Scarborough (Which he had) however, no investigation was undertaken and North Yorkshire Police continued to use him to support crime prevention campaigns in late 2008. Consequently, Britains most dangerous paedophile and rapist was provided with his own personal police car by North Yorkshire Police to ferry him from his home to Community Idol event, where he was introduced to impressionable young people by the police and presented them with electronic goods and vouchers worth variously £50, £30 £20 and £10 to them. All 20 finalists received a certificate signed by Jimmy Savile in the presence of the Chief Constable (Who had also served in West Yorkshire Police).

To quote The ACPO publication Guidance on the Management of Police Information (ACPO/NPIA 2ND Edition: p13)

Effective policing depends on efficient information management.’  

This has been a cornerstone of British Policing following an investigation by a very fine British Police Officer, Sir Lawrence Byford and his team from HMIC into the intelligence and data management failures in West Yorkshire Police, that prevented the early arrest of the Yorkshire Ripper in the 1970´s.  The recommendations and improvements made as a result of the HMIC investigation were supposed to prevent any more failures of police intelligence.

More information on the HMIC investigation here at 1 hour 32 minutes:

Following on from the intelligence failures central to the Soham murders, the next advance in Police intelligence sharing was the Bichard report which recommended the introduction of a national police intelligence system for England and Wales and a clear code of practice for all police forces for record keeping and sharing data. INI was the first system to deliver improvements in the management and sharing of police operational information following Sir Michael Bichard’s report.

Despite the assurances given of improvements in the sharing of police intelligence, it is clear that whilst Surrey, Dorset and Sussex Police were able to work and cooperate effectively in sharing police intelligence through the INI system, neither West Yorkshire Police or North Yorkshire Police could hold intelligence information securely, access it efficiently or use the INI system.  In addition North Yorkshire Police did not use HOLMES efficiently or did not enter information into it on Jaconelli, Savile and Corrigan.

The response of the authorities to these concerns.


As a result of the original misleading statement that there was no connection between Jimmy Savile and North Yorkshire, North Yorkshire Police were omitted from the HMIC investigation ordered by Home Secretary Theresa May and conducted by Ms Dru Sharpling.

I have written to Ms Sharpling requesting that she direct that the HMIC investigation into Jimmy Savile is re-opened to include North Yorkshire Police.  I have received the following responses to my concerns from Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary Dru Sharpling, CBE

  • “As stated in your letter the review was informed by an approach to all forces in the United Kingdom; asking them to provide any intelligence they held regarding Mr Savile. As you also state North Yorkshire Police did not provide any intelligence and therefore did not form part of the review.
  • I also note that, as a result of your enquiries, you have requested that the Jimmy Savile review be re-opened.
  • HMIC has already committed in ‘Mistakes were made’ to undertaking further work as part of our child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation review. This work is currently ongoing and more details can be found on our website. We will take the information you have provided into consideration as part of this ongoing work.”



IPCC Director of Investigations Moir Stewart has had sight of this article and is fully aware of the evidence contained within them.  I have written to him asking that he directs North Yorkshire Police and West Yorkshire Police to refer several officers to the IPCC so these allegations can be investigated.  An IPCC Spokesman commented:

“We are considering your further correspondence. If we decide to take any action on the information you have sent us, we will inform you. If we issue any press releases, on either matter, you will of course be entitled to receive copies.”

Mr Stewart was formerly a senior officer in the Metropolitan Police that was criticised by the IPCC over his conduct following the Jean Charles de Menezes shooting.

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)

To quote the Operation Ornament Report.  Paragraph 11.8:

The use and effectiveness of the INI and information held by other forces on individuals is worthy of further scrutiny and has been raised by ACC Kirkby with the present MPS Operation Yewtree leadership and the ACPO lead for Child Protection matters.  It is acknowledged that ACPO, under the leadership of CC Mike Barton have commissioned a review of PND with set terms of reference that relate to the effectiveness of the system for police information sharing.”

Chief Constable Barton, ACPO spokesman on intelligence has had sight of a draft of this article and has not commented.

North Yorkshire Police.

North Yorkshire Police have had sight of a draft of this article and has not commented.

West Yorkshire Police

Author of the Operation Newgreen report West Yorkshire Police Detective Chief Superintendent Dave Knopwood said:

Our internal inquiry has been independently reviewed and contains all our findings, good, bad or otherwise. The report is published in full on our website for everyone to see.  We also sent a copy to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, who are currently conducting their own investigation.  “As previously stated, we will continue to co-operate fully with the IPCC to ensure they have the necessary information to in order they can take a decision as to whether an IPCC investigation is required. The Force has welcomed the independent overview that the engagement of the IPCC provides.”

In short West Yorkshire are resting on the IPCC investigation having been concluded.


Whilst I take some comfort that the new information provided by Real Whitby will be considered by the HMIC child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation review and I hope it is helpful.  Nevertheless, it causes me some concern that Ms Sharpling takes the view that because North Yorkshire Police did not provide any intelligence, it should not be included in the Jimmy Savile review, particularly as this is contrary to the Home Secretary’s directive.  Surely someone should be asking why North Yorkshire Police did not have any intelligence on Savile and his associate Jaconelli, despite the fact that Jaconelli was well known for interfering with children in Scarborough for many years.

As it currently stands therefore, the IPCC and HMIC examinations are both clearly unsound because individual forces have been exonerated without examining the inter-force information flows between all of the police forces that Real Whitby has undertaken.  Further, having had this pointed out to them, neither organisation will comment on this or re-open its investigation into Jimmy Savile. This can best be summed up as a united front of silence and bureaucratic intransigence.

Commenting on Operation Newgreen, Alan Collins a solicitor representing 40 of Savile’s victims is quoted in the Telegraph as having told ITV’s Daybreak programme:

The report begs a lot more questions. It provides some answers but the report reveals memories that are not as sharp as perhaps they ought to be, ‘can’t remember’, documents that can’t seem to be located. It doesn’t add up.  But my take is that there seems to be a collective myopia and the collective myopia is evidenced by Savile. He was able to run rings around the police for decades. He used police officers.  He was ingrained with them, dovetailed with them.

Unusually, Chief Constable Nick Gargan of Avon and Somerset has broken ranks and also criticised West Yorkshire Police over its handling of its Savile enquiry. He is quoted in the Yorkshire Post as saying:

It seems clear to me that Operation Newgreen does not have the look and feel of an independent report. As I turned from one page to the next, I saw example after example of the author putting the case for West Yorkshire Police.  At times this case was put with some force and emotion and more than a hint of exasperation with other bodies.  In that respect, Operation Newgreen was unsuccessful if it was its intention to give an impression of independent assurance: it may even have had the effect of strengthening suspicion that West Yorkshire Police was at the very least being defensive.”

Mr Gargan suggested the force carry out a “very open and public examination of its actions” and a public engagement strategy to deal with issues raised by the review. He said: “I think you will benefit from a situation in which your staff respond to criticism with the questions ‘maybe this person has a point’ more readily than ‘how do I prove them wrong?’.

These comments could apply to the North Yorkshire Report. In my opinion only a full judicial enquiry will get anywhere near to establishing what happened.


Other related articles

BBC Inside Out Monday the 10th of February is to cover Peter Jaconelli and other Real Whitby related topics.


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